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Introduction
The greatest disappointment of 
the post-Communist era has been 
the failure of the West –particu-
larly Europe – to build a successful 
relationship with Russia. Most pol-
icy-makers and experts expected 
that, after an inevitably troublesome 
period of transition, Russia would 
join the United States and Europe 
in a strategic and economic partner-
ship, based on shared interests and 
values. The pace of change might 
be doubtful, but not its direction. 
Vladimir Putin’s massive electoral 
triumph in the Duma elections of 
2007 has put the lie to that notion. 
His shameless manipulation of 
the voting system confi rms the 
view that the Kremlin has ceased 
to care what the West thinks about 
its internal political processes. 
Today a resurgent Russia is the 
world’s foremost revionist power, 
rejecting a status quo predicated on 
the notion of a Western victory in 
the cold war.1 Its two super-power 
assets – nuclear weapons and energy 
– make it a potential leader of all 
those lesser powers dissatisfi ed with 
their present position in the world. 
A potential Russia-China axis based 
on shared resistance to US hegemony 
carries the seeds of a new bipolarity.2 
Western expectations of post-
Communist Russia’s trajectory rested 
on three assumptions that proved 
to be mistaken. The fi rst was the 
irreversibility of the loss of empire: I 
shall argue that this view is rejected 
by most of Russia’s elite. The second 
was the view that the United States 
would continue to provide the world 
with ‘multilateral’ leadership. This 
view was shattered by the George W. 
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Bush Administration’s ‘unilateral-
ism’: US unilateralism was the cue 
for Russia to pursue its own. The 
third was the assumption that Russia 
would become economically inte-
grated with the West, and especially 
Europe. This has not yet happened. 
The underlying question in all 
this is: how far has the ‘defeat’ of 
1990-1, which involved large loss of 
population and territory, overcome 
the long history of empire and autoc-
racy? To put it differently: how far 
has it ruptured Russia’s ‘civilization’, 
which was so bound up with the 
troubled history of its empire? Has it 
forced Russia to see itself as a nation 
rather than as an empire? Has it 
forced on Russia, willy-nilly, a Euro-
pean rather than a Eurasian future?
New International 
Doctrine: Multipolarity
A common interpretation of Russia’s 
contemporary foreign policy is that it 
lacks an ideological basis.3 It is true 
that it has retreated to pragmatism 
or ‘functionalism’ in the light of the 
failures of the ambitious ‘partnership’ 
hopes entertained by Mikhail Gor-
bachev, Boris Yeltsin, and the early 
Putin. It cooperates on some issues, 
like Iran and terrorism; it obstructs on 
others like Kosovo. However, there 
exists an official doctrine of Russian 
foreign policy, and, beyond that, the 
first stirrings of a new ideology of 
imperialism, which mimics a parallel 
development in the United States. 
‘Multipolarity’ is the official 
Russian doctrine of international 
relations, as it is of China and 
France. Russia continues to view of 
itself as an independent great power 
separate from the European Union. 
As I shall argue, this implies that 
Russia still sees itself as an empire 
rather than as a nation-state.
A New Ideology of Empire
Russian thoughts about how to 
retrieve their global position turn 
naturally to the need to recover 
a high degree of control over 
the Soviet space surrendered by 
Yeltsin in 1991. This is mainly 
disguised, but the imperial hoof-
beat is starting to be heard. 
Anatoly Chubais’s theory of 
‘liberal empire’ was first aired in Sep-
tember 2003. Mixing hyperbole with 
regret, he claimed that in 1991 ‘the 
greatest empire of all time ceased to 
exist’. Russia should now construct a 
‘liberal empire’ from the pieces of the 
old Soviet Union. While respecting its 
neighbours ‘inviolability of borders 
and territorial integrity’, Russia’s 
‘mission’ should be to promote Rus-
sian culture and protect the Russian 
populations in its ‘neighbourhood’, 
establish a dominant position in its 
neighbours’ trade and business (‘in 
the acquisition and development of 
assets’) and guarantee their ‘freedom 
and democracy’. ‘It’s high time to 
call a spade a spade’, Chubais said. 
Russia was the ‘natural and unique 
leader’ of the Confederation of Inde-
pendent States. Its strategic task was 
to ‘beef up, increase and strengthen 
its leadership position in this part 
of the globe’. Only thus, Chubais 
argued, ‘can Russia occupy its natu-
ral place alongside the United States, 
the European Union and Japan, in 
a ring of great democracies… the 
place designated for it by history’.4
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Chubais is important as head of 
the electricity monopoly, UES; Vladis-
lav Surkov is arguably more so, as 
Putin’s chief politologist. Surkov’s 
phrase ‘sovereign democracy’ dates 
from a speech to a United Russia 
seminar in February 2006. He means 
by it the right of Russians to make 
their own decisions. This requires a 
strong government in a continental-
sized state, able to use its energy 
windfalls to diversify the Russian 
economy, make it respected in the 
world, and reverse the incentive 
of the Russian elite to become an 
‘offshore aristocracy’. For Surkov, as 
for most Russians, Russia was ‘on 
the verge of losing its sovereignty’ 
under Yeltsin. Political break-up 
and economic liberalisation led to 
extraordinary accumulations of 
private plunder. Without democracy 
Russia will be unstable. But without 
sovereignty, foreign powers will use 
its democracy to undermine Russian 
independence. Russia can protect 
its sovereignty by re-establishing 
its dominance over its near abroad. 
‘For 500 years [Russia] was a modern 
state. It made history and was not 
made by it’, Surkov says, ‘We differ 
strongly’ from Slovaks, Baltic nations 
and even Ukrainians – they had no 
state system… Russian politicians 
of the past drew them on maps’.5 
Unlike old panslavists or Ortho-
dox Christians like Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn, Chubais and Surkov 
claim to be modernist and pragmatic 
in their approach. The question they 
address is: what are the conditions 
of independence in today’s world? 
How is independence to be pre-
served against the triple challenge 
of American domination, globali-
zation, and ethnic nationalism?
Their answer lies in the multipo-
lar organization of states, but it is 
evident that only some states can 
be sovereign. A hierarchy of states 
is a fact of life. Some countries are 
fated to be sovereign, others to be 
subjects; some to be spiders oth-
ers to be flies. Russia is one of the 
world’s natural sovereigns, made so 
by its size, its resources, its politi-
cal will. Backing this approach is 
the view that small nation-states 
are doomed by globalization. They 
are too weak to defend their sover-
eignty, politically, strategically, or 
economically. The alternative they 
face is either to be gobbled up by 
the American ‘world empire’ or to 
join great powers in new forms of 
‘collective imperial sovereignty’. 
Russians see themselves caught in 
America’s spider web: they demand 
the right to weave one of their own. 
Their neo-imperialism is a matter-
of-fact solution to the problem, as 
they see it, of a unipolar world in 
an age when the idea of territo-
rial imperialism is bankrupt.
‘Without democracy Russia 
will be unstable. But without 
sovereignty, foreign powers will 
use its democracy to undermine 
Russian independence’
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The new ideology of empire is 
underpinned by three arguments: 
the ‘logic’ of geopolitics, rejection 
by the West, and the potential to 
exploit Russia’s newly-acquired 
position as an energy superpower.
Geopolitics
The influence of geopolitics stems 
from Russia’s position astride 
Europe and Asia. This makes it feel 
both superior and vulnerable. Its 
immense size and reach make it the 
neighbour that no country can afford 
to ignore. Policy makers in Europe, 
the Middle East, Central Asia and 
the Far East must all take Russia into 
account. On the other hand, Russia’s 
immense spread leaves it vulner-
able to attack on many frontiers, a 
weakness confirmed by its historical 
experience of invasions. To be secure 
it feels it needs to control much 
more of the Eurasian heartland than 
it currently does. It has felt keenly 
the loss of the geographical buffers 
that enabled it three times to orga-
nise a successful defence in depth 
against a western invader.6 Now 
the potential enemy – the United 
States, NATO – is encamped much 
closer to Russia’s heart. The fear of 
military invasion may seem fanci-
ful today, but the fear, for instance, 
of the West using Muslim states to 
confine Russia is long-standing, and 
is reinforced by the US presence in 
the Caucasus and central Asia.7 There 
is also a fear of economic strangula-
tion. Anatole Lieven notes that ‘any 
state as dependent for its prosperity 
on rivers as was the case with early 
modern Russia was almost certain 
to seek control of the whole extent of 
these rivers and their exits to the sea. 
To do otherwise was to allow foreign 
and, very probably, hostile states to 
tax and interdict one’s trade at will’.8 
Today’s reflex is the demand to con-
trol the territories of the CIS through 
which the oil and gas pipelines run.9
‘The West does not Love Us’
This perception is near ubiquitous, 
and long-standing. The West repudi-
ated Russia’s overtures, so it must 
carve out for itself a separate destiny. 
Chubais says: ‘We must not join the 
EU or NATO. We do not ‘fit’ there 
either economically, politically or 
geographically.’10 Surkov echoes 
him: ‘It would be good to flee to 
Europe, but they will not receive us 
there…It is better to be enemies and 
not ambiguous friends as is the case 
now!’11 Rejection of a subordinate 
European future could not be clearer.
The love-hate relationship with 
the West has, of course, been a leit-
motiv of Russian history. The urgent 
desire to catch up the West; imita-
tion followed by a sense of rejection; 
the turning back to a non-Western 
vision of Russia, whether Eurasian, 
Orthodox, or just simply Russian; the 
inability to find a balance between 
what Russia needs to share with 
the West to be modern, and what it 
needs to retain to stay Russian: all 
these themes have been played out 
repeatedly. Lieven quotes Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky: ‘In Europe we were 
hangers-on and slaves, whereas in 
Asia we shall go as masters’.12
Putin started as a sincere Europe-
anist. There was a ready-made axis 
– following on from the Ostpolitik 
of the 1970s – between Russia and 
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Germany, and Putin’s own time as 
a KGB officer in Germany. Putin 
had a notably warm relationship 
with former Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder. Germany has backed 
the Baltic gas pipeline, against the 
wishes of Poland and the Baltic 
states. Russia joined France and 
Germany in opposing the Iraq war. 
EU enlargement has shattered 
the idea of a ‘natural’ EU-Russian 
partnership, by making members 
of vociferously anti-Russian states 
like Poland and Estonia.13 The chief 
priority of the former Soviet satellites 
is to use the EU and NATO to contain 
Russia, whereas Russia’s desire was 
for a partnership with Europe to 
contain the United States. As Russia’s 
hopes for partnership with the EU 
faded, it has started to treat the entity 
with ill-disguised contempt, prefer-
ring to ‘divide and rule’ through 
bilateral arrangements with the pow-
erful members. There is now active 
rivalry between the EU and Russia 
for control of the ‘post-Soviet space’. 
Russia is not part of the EU’s ‘Neigh-
bourhood Policy’.The four ‘common 
spaces’ of cooperation (economics 
and trade; internal security; foreign 
and security policy; education, sci-
ence, and culture) have barely moved 
beyond the discussion stage. There is 
no agreement on energy security. The 
bi-annual EU-Russia summits have 
become increasingly bad-tempered.14 
All this was fairly predictable in 
light of the shift of Russia’s frontier 
eastwards: Russia has ceased to mat-
ter so much in the European balance 
of power system. But, in addition, 
Putin’s policy of making Russia an 
integral part of ‘the concert of Euro-
pean nations’ was inconsistent with 
his determination to keep ‘Russian 
internal policy... exclusively a Rus-
sian concern’.15 If the EU stands for 
anything it is democracy, human 
rights, civil liberties, and Russia’s 
internal politics have affronted all 
three. Today Russia is less part of 
the political structure of Europe 
than it was before the First World 
War, or even in Soviet times.
The economic relationship 
between Russia and EU while quan-
titatively impressive (over 50 per cent 
of Russia’s trade is with the EU) is 
very narrowly based. Russia’s trade 
with the EU consists mainly of an 
exchange of commodities for machin-
ery and consumer goods. Trade in 
services is small in comparison and 
one-sided: Russia buys financial 
services and sends tourists. The 
picture is one of pragmatic coopera-
tion but very little integration. Russia 
still sees its economic relationship 
with the EU – and indeed with most 
other countries – in terms of deals 
between para-statal companies, 
rather than market integration: a 
relic of old Soviet thinking which 
still impedes Russia’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization. 
At the official level, ‘the goal of 
incremental integration has given 
way to the goal of pragmatic coex-
istence between separate entities 
European and Russo-Eurasian’. 16
Putin’s relationship with US has 
failed too, despite his warm feel-
ings towards Bush. He invested a 
lot of political capital in it in the first 
couple of years of his presidency. He 
brilliantly exploited the opportunity 
opened up by 9/11 to construct an 
anti-terrorist coalition. He was the 
first to telephone Bush after the ter-
rorist attack on New York and the 
Pentagon. Overruling his military, 
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he gave unconditional support to 
the US in Afghanistan, and military 
access to central Asian countries 
bound to Russia by security treaty, 
while closing down Russian bases in 
Cuba and Vietnam. He acceded to the 
American request to lower the price 
of oil. He was ready to discard earlier 
Russian insistence on the primacy 
of Security Council resolutions, and 
hinted that the US anti-missile shield 
programme could be developed in 
the context of the ABM Treaty.17 Offi-
cials from both sides started to talk 
about a ‘strategic partnership’. The 
Russian elite started to compare the 
anti-terrorist coalition with the anti-
Hitler alliance, and fondly recalled 
Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘big policemen’ 
model of postwar arrangements.
But the pay-off was meagre. There 
was satisfactory silence on Chech-
nya, but Russia was not offered a 
fast track to WTO membership,or a 
meaningful security role in NATO 
and the Middle East. Putin had 
hoped to get NATO involved in 
Russia’s military reforms.18 Instead 
NATO frontline troops were estab-
lished on the soil of its neighbours, 
and NATO has started on the process 
of admitting all nine former Warsaw 
Pact members, while shelving plans 
to include Russia as a partner.19. The 
United States unilaterally abrogated 
the ABM treaty, thus precipitating the 
collapse of the arms control regime. 
Moreover, a series of US-inspired 
(or at least CIA-financed) ‘coloured’ 
revolutions in Serbia, Georgia and 
Ukraine have increased Russia’s 
sense of isolation and paranoia by 
depriving it of reliable clients. Dmitri 
Trenin, director of the liberal Carn-
egie Moscow Centre, had looked 
forward to a ‘quasi-alliance’ with 
the United States in 2001. By 2006 
he was lamenting ‘the decoupling of 
Russia from the West’.20 At Munich, 
on 10 February 2007, Putin sounded 
like a jilted lover. He still thought 
of Bush as his friend, but realized 
that ‘the system of international 
relations is just like mathematics. 
There are no personal dimensions’.
To put it in a nutshell, Putin’s 
geopolitical strategy lies in ruins. 
Failing to grasp the extent of the 
demands the EU would make of it or 
the irrelevance to the United States 
of Moscow’s loyalty, the Kremlin 
has retreated to bad-tempered prag-
matism. This is the seed from which 
the ‘imperial project’ sprouts.
Energy Superpower
The material basis of current Russian 
self-assertiveness is the dramatic 
improvement in its economic posi-
tion: a full treasury, freedom from 
foreign loans, above all its emer-
gence as an ‘energy superpower’.
The phrase needs explanation. As 
late as 1999, The Economist looked 
‘Russia is well placed to  
exploit both the “economic” 
and the “geopolitical”  
potential of energy’
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forward to ‘a world in which supply 
and demand [in energy] were deter-
mined not by geopolitics and cartels, 
but by geology and markets’, musing 
that this state of affairs would force 
down the price of oil to $5 a barrel.21 
In a competitive market, the producer 
of energy has no power: energy 
cannot be used for foreign policy or 
for any purpose other than to supply 
consumers at prices they are willing 
to pay, to the mutual benefit of both. 
But this is not the world in which 
we live. The fact that there are only 
a few major sources of supply for 
a commodity which is in high and 
growing demand, and for which 
there is no ready substitute, gives the 
producers of that commodity market 
power. In energy, producer cartels 
and oligopolies dominate the market. 
Such producer organizations can fix 
prices. But if, in addition, producer 
groups are under political control, 
governments can use this control 
for foreign policy purposes. Ever 
since OPEC quadrupled oil prices 
and interdicted supply during the 
Arab-Israeli war of 1973-4 the world 
has worried about ‘energy security’.
Russia is well placed to exploit 
both the ‘economic’ and the ‘geopo-
litical’ potential of energy. It has the 
world’s largest reserves of natural 
gas and is the world’s second largest 
exporter of oil after Saudi Arabia. 
Putin has made the oil and gas sec-
tors his power base, domestically and 
internationally. In 1994, the Kremlin 
wrested control of oil from the oil 
barons by dismantling the largest pri-
vate producer Yukos, and has boosted 
the monopoly position of Gazprom, 
the state gas company, as part of its 
policy of keeping ‘strategic sectors’ of 
the economy under national con-
trol. State control of these resources 
boosts sovereignty in the precise 
sense defined by Surkov: that is, by 
boosting independence. It makes 
you less dependent on others than 
others are on you. CIS countries are 
almost totally dependent on Russian 
supplies of energy and/or Russian-
owned pipelines. Russia has also 
begun acquiring ownership of oil and 
gas assets in its former Central Asian 
republics, especially in Kazakhstan.22 
The EU is dependent on Gazprom 
for one-quarter of its energy needs.
This puts Russia in a position 
to use energy as an instrument of 
imperial restoration in the former 
Soviet space, and to bargain with 
the EU about ‘energy security’. It 
aims to buy the political loyalty of 
the western CIS republics in return 
for cheap energy; but is ready to 
punish them by interrupting sup-
ply if they veer too closely to the 
West. The EU’s vulnerability to 
interrupted supply was brought 
home when Russia temporarily 
stopped natural gas deliveries to the 
Ukraine on 1 January 2006, which 
had a knock-on effect on gas deliv-
eries from the Ukraine to Europe. 
The same year, Gazprom signed a 
Baltic pipeline deal with the Ger-
man BASG and Eon to supply gas 
directly to Germany, by-passing 
Poland and other east European 
countries. Although Russia claims 
to be a ‘reliable supplier’, its actions 
suggest the contrary. Gazprom 
has threatened to withhold supply 
unless it was allowed to invest in 
downstream business in the EU. 
Its proposal to build a pipeline to 
China from western Siberia which 
is the main source of gas to Europe 
suggests that future supply will be 
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subject to arbitrage between Europe 
and China. This will create an arti-
ficial shortage, pushing up prices. 
In response to Russia’s ‘oil and gas 
imperialism’23, the EU Commission 
has tried to build a counter-cartel 
of oil-consuming nations to bargain 
with Russia. The Commission aims 
to force the complete separation of 
energy networks from companies 
that supply gas and electricity. 
The deal would allow Gazprom to 
acquire downstream facilities in 
the EU on condition that it offered 
EU companies reciprocal facili-
ties to buy its own pipelines.24
Part of the EU’s worry is not 
that Russia or terrorists might turn 
the taps off, but that it might fail 
to increase its capacity to meet 
Europe’s growing demand. The 
EU’s response has been to encour-
age Russia to open its energy market 
to foreign investment. Russia’s 
incentives are different. Its Stabi-
lization Fund has built up a huge 
surplus, so it does not need to sell 
more oil and gas. Russians also 
point out that the United States can 
print as many dollars as it wants 
to enable other countries to buy 
Russia’s energy. But energy is a non-
renewable resource, which needs 
to be preserved, not squandered. 
The doctrines of ‘liberal empire’ 
and ‘sovereign democracy’ are 
designed to provide an ideologi-
cal underpinning for the attempt to 
reconstitute, in modern clothes, the 
Tsarist empire and its Soviet succes-
sor, as a condition for a new global 
balance of great powers. This is the 
Russian project. But what is desired is 
not the same as what is possible. The 
latter depends on ‘objective facts’, 
including the response of others to 
Russian actions. In the concluding 
part of this talk I want to consider 
the possibilities of realizing the two 
connected parts of the ‘grand design’. 
Reconstitution of the Empire
The Soviet Union collapsed, in 
part, because it failed to ‘square the 
demands of power, which required 
a state of continental size, with the 
challenge presented by ethnic nation-
alism’.25 The doctrines of ‘liberal 
empire’ and ‘sovereign democracy’ 
recapitulate this dilemma, but add 
to it the real danger of conflict with 
the West. Twenty-five million ethnic 
Russians and a further 100 million 
non-Russian subjects were ‘lost’ to 
the empire when the Soviet Union 
collapsed. Russia’s claim to be the 
protector of the rights and inter-
ests of all Russians in the former 
Soviet Union is a claim to a right 
of intervention. This is not only 
incompatible with the promise to 
respect its neighbours’ borders, but 
risks a military confrontation with 
the West in states like Latvia and 
Estonia, which have large Russian 
minorities and whose independ-
ence is guaranteed by the EU and 
NATO. Further potential for conflict 
arises from Putin’s implicit threat to 
dislodge the United States from its 
positions in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia and his military doctrine that 
defines the frontiers of the former 
Soviet republics as the strategic 
frontiers of the Russian Federation.26
Chubais has shifted the emphasis 
of ‘liberal empire’ from the poten-
tially explosive issues of frontiers 
and Russian irridenta to energy and 
business links. In its more modest 
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version it boils down to manipulating 
the internal politics and economics 
of the CIS states so as to keep them 
within Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’.
However, there are big difficulties 
in the way of Moscow creating client 
states through political and business 
manipulation. Most post-Communist 
leaders in Europe and the Caucasus 
(Alexander Lukashenko of Bela-
rus is a notorious exception) have 
created their political identity by 
positioning themselves as independ-
ent, pro-Western democrats. This is 
particularly true in the Ukraine and 
Georgia. This means that Russian-
backed candidates do not always 
win elections. Imperial activism on 
its western borders has been marked 
by series of defeats, the most pain-
ful being Russia’s failed interference 
in Ukrainian elections of 2004. Nor 
could Russia affect election results in 
Moldova. Its hold over Georgia was 
upset by the collapse of the Eduard 
Sheverdnadze regime in Novem-
ber 2003, and it had to promise to 
withdraw its troops. As a result of 
such reverses, Russia is tempted to 
exploit ‘frozen conflicts’ in Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
and Transdnestria to destabilize the 
Caucasus and Moldova. But this 
may be a losing game, since lead-
ers like Mikhail Sakaashvili can use 
these conflicts to lever support from 
the West. Putin’s centralizing drive 
within the Russian Federation – 
which includes the war to prevent 
Chechnyan independence – under-
mines any belief by states currently 
detached from Russia that Russia 
will champion their autonomy in an 
expanded Russian federation: there is 
unlikely to be a Russian equivalent of 
Hong Kong. Even Belarus is unen-
thusiastic about joining a Greater 
Russia.27 Arkady Moshes argues 
that Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and 
Ukraine constitute an emergent 
identity ‘Intermediate Europe’, 
not ready for integration into 
EU-Atlantic structures, but increas-
ingly de-coupled from Russia.28
On the economic side, Russia 
can threaten energy and trade sanc-
tions, but these are double-edged 
weapons. Cutting energy supplies 
to Ukraine and Belarus jeopard-
ises energy exports to the EU, and 
in any case energy subsidies are 
being phased out. Closing labour 
markets to CIS migrants dam-
ages the construction and services 
industries. Slapping on trade 
embargoes goes against the interests 
of Russian business expansion.
Nor does Russia offer its former 
republics a model of success. It does 
not lead in economic growth, it is 
riddled with crime and corruption. In 
GDP at PPP per capita Russia ranks 
59th in the world with $12,178, well 
under half the EU average.29 The UN 
‘There are big difficulties  
in the way of Moscow  
creating client states  
through political and  
business manipulation’
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Human Development Index (which 
takes account of life expectancy and 
education) puts Russia in 65th place, 
roughly the same as Brazil, with 
Poland far ahead at 37.30 The Council 
of Europe has kept up a barrage on 
Russia’s record on human rights.
Finally, imperialism today lacks 
a doctrinal basis. Tsarism offered 
dynastic loyalty, Pan-Slavism, 
Orthodoxy. The Soviet Union had 
communism. Today’s Russian 
imperialists are forced to be prag-
matists. In a world where success is 
increasingly measured by economic 
prosperity and human security, the 
EU, the United States, and even 
China offer alternative poles of 
attraction, even for Russians. The 
world economy would have to go 
horribly wrong for ancient tribal 
loyalties to determine Russia’s future.
Given the failure of liberal empire 
in the west, it is not surprising 
that Russia has recently switched 
emphasis, reintegrating the five 
newly independent, but landlocked, 
countries of Central Asia, where 
its exports of capital and autocracy 
are more welcome. Russia backed 
Uzbekistan in the face of criticism 
from the United States and the EU 
over its brutal suppression of a rebel-
lion in Andijan on 13 May 2005. In 
return, Islam Karimov severed ties 
with America and, five months later, 
signed the ‘Treaty on Allied Rela-
tions’ granting Russia the right to use 
military force on Uzbek territory.31 
This follows security agreements 
already in place with Tajikstan, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Rus-
sia’s rapprochement with its Central 
Asian neighbours also has important 
commercial dimensions. Both agree-
ments with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
gave Russian companies priority 
in large-scale projects and priva-
tizations, and with both countries 
desperate for foreign investment 
Russia looks set to buy liberal empire 
with its petrodollars. Keeping the 
region’s corrupt dictators afloat 
also offers Russia a bulwark against 
the spread of radical Islam from 
unstable countries to the South.
It is quite conceivable that Russia’s 
‘soft power’ – the power of attraction 
- will grow organically from the seeds 
already there: the Russian language, 
still the lingua franca throughout 
the CIS, the Russian irridenta scat-
tered through the ‘near abroad’, and 
Russian culture, increasingly acces-
sible through satellite TV channels 
and Russian films. Russia could do 
much more than it currently does to 
encourage tourism. Although Russia 
cannot provide CIS countries with ‘an 
attractive model of socio-economic 
and political development’, it is also 
true that migration into Russia ‘has 
become Eurasia’s safety valve’.32
But the main missing ingredient 
in Russia’s ‘soft power’ is the percep-
tion of success. The more successful 
Russia is seen to be as an economy, a 
polity, and a society the more attrac-
tive it will become to Russians and 
others living beyond its borders. 
The Challenge to the 
United States
Russia rejects the United States’s 
right to rule the world; it denies that 
it has the power to do so. These are 
different claims, the first affecting 
legitimacy, the second capability. 
In the recent international rela-
tions literature the distinction 
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has become blurred, because of 
acceptance of ‘soft power’as a key 
component of capability. The ques-
tion is: will America have enough 
power – in this enlarged sense – to 
remain the world’s only ‘super-
power’ for the foreseeable future?
Polarity is about the distribution 
of power within the international 
system. Multi-polarity describes a 
distribution of power in which more 
than two states have nearly equal 
amounts of military, cultural and 
economic influence. On the surface 
multi-polarity seems far away. In 
relative terms, the United States ‘is 
militarily more powerful than any 
political entity since the Roman 
Empire’.33 It is the world’s largest 
economy, by far the world’s larg-
est defence spender, and the only 
country which continually upgrades 
its military technology. Deepak Lal 
calculates that ‘based on past and 
current [economic] performance and 
future prospects, the only potential 
competitors to US military power 
are the Chinese (by perhaps mid-
century) and the Indians by the end 
of the century’. But ‘given the US 
technological lead, these potential 
dates for military catch-up are likely 
to be even later’. Thus he is able to 
conclude that ‘for at least this century 
it is unlikely that US military power 
will be challenged’.34 But America’s 
technological lead may not mean 
as much as is claimed for it. Iraq 
shows that ‘asymmetric warfare’ can 
partly neutralize it. Terrorist actions 
do not require much in the way of 
resources or technology. Edward 
Luttwak has argued that the US does 
not possess enough ruthlessness 
to win wars against terrorists.35
A somewhat different perspective 
is given by the ‘Correlates of War’ 
project of the University of Michigan. 
This aims to measure the distribu-
tion of power in the international 
system as a whole. To this end it 
has calculated an index of the ‘coef-
ficient of power’ in the world since 
1816, where zero represents perfect 
equality and one perfect concentra-
tion. Its main long-run finding is that 
power tends to concentrate during 
and immediately after big wars and 
then to disperse. In 1946, the United 
States had just over 50 per cent of 
great power military capability, the 
Soviet Union was second with 20 per 
cent, and Britain third with 10 per 
cent. By 2001, the United States had 
30 per cent, Russia had shrunk to 12 
per cent, China had come up to 20 
per cent. (China’s high score reflects 
population and size of economy in 
the weighting).36 So although the 
‘hard power’ asymmetry is still there, 
it is much less marked than it was 
in 1945. Such calculations need to 
be taken with a large pinch of salt, 
but one can see that the makings of 
a global balance of power system of 
a ‘mathematical’ kind do exist, on 
the basis of alliances of the weaker 
great powers to check the stronger.
However, the ‘Correlates of 
War’ methodology may still over-
estimate US capabilities. Not size of 
economies but size of manufactur-
ing base should be compared. The 
size of the manufacturing sector 
in the US economy has shrunk 
from 37 per cent in 1960 to 18 per 
cent today.37 On present free trade 
policy the United States is set to 
lose practically all its manufactur-
ing industry in a decade or two.
The Russian thesis of an evolu-
tion towards multi-polarity is thus 
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perfectly plausible. A separate 
question is whether Russia will be 
one of the ‘poles’. Most Russian 
elites think it inconceivable that it 
will not be. But this is not obvious. 
Three of the ‘correlates’ of power 
considered by the Michigan project 
are population, size of economy, 
and political system, the last two 
relevant to the ability to mobilise 
hard power and project ‘soft power’ 
respectively. Russia’s perform-
ance in all three areas raise doubts 
about its future as a global power.
Demography
For Russia this is a well-known 
disaster area. The population of the 
Soviet Union was 293 million in 
1990, the USA’s 255 million. In 1993 
the population of Russian Federa-
tion was 149m. So Russia lost about 
140 million people when the Soviet 
Union broke up. This loss has been 
compounded by the subseqent 
decline of the Russian population as 
a result of an increase in the death 
rate and simultaneous decrease in 
birth rate. It is projected to fall from 
143 million today to between 137 
million and 125 million in 20 years 
time, and down to below100 million 
by 2050.38 America’s population has 
meanwhile risen to 300 million, and 
is expected to stay there. These fig-
ures are of course, dwarfed by China 
and India. Male life expectancy in 
Russia has fallen to below 60, largely 
due to alcoholism, suicide, industrial 
accidents, murders, etc... Russian 
women live longer but they too lag 
up to 10 years behind their western 
counterparts. The quality of Rus-
sia’s population may also be falling 
as educated Russians flock abroad, 
to be replaced by low-paid manual 
workers. One expert has written that 
‘no other country has such a negative 
combination of demographic indica-
tors as Russia, even among the least 
developed countries in the world’.39 
Russia’s problem is not only 
the size of its population but also 
its distribution. The Soviets set-
tled 30m Russians east of the Urals, 
but many are now trickling back 
to European Russia. Today only 18 
million Russians live in the far east.40 
Everyone (Russians and migrants) 
wants to live in large cities in the 
western part of Russia, and no one 
wants to live in the east. So there 
are not enough Russians to settle 
and defend most of their country 
– at least by conventional means.
It is generally agreed that the 
negative economic and political 
consequences of a declining popu-
lation can only be offset through 
migration. But Russian nationalism is 
hostile to the immigration of non-
Slavs like Armenians, Caucasians, 
and Asians. Two hundred thousand 
Chinese live in Russia, mostly across 
from the Manchurian border, but 
the Chinese are portrayed as want-
‘Demographic trends face 
Russia with a choice between 
two futures: that of nation or 
multinational empire’
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ing to annex their underpopulated 
eastern territories. Figures are cited 
showing that the percentage of ethnic 
Russians in the Russian Federa-
tion has fallen from 80 per cent in 
1989 to 70 per cent today. At present 
immigration policy concentrates on 
encouraging Russian migrants from 
former Soviet republics, of whom 
there is a pool of some 25 million.
Demographic trends face Russia 
with a choice between two futures: 
that of nation or multinational 
empire. Russia could aim to con-
solidate ethnic Russians within a 
shrunken European and central Asian 
‘space’, with a possible future within, 
rather than apart from, the European 
Union. Or, like the Tsars and the 
Soviets, Russia could adopt a con-
scious state policy to develop eastern 
Russia. Companies like Gazprom and 
Rosneft could increase their invest-
ments into oil and gas exploration in 
eastern Siberia,where most of poten-
tial oil and gas is located. 41 But any 
policy of developing eastern Siberia 
requires drastic revision of current 
attitudes to foreign investment in the 
energy sector and immigration from 
Asia. Liberal empire means multina-
tionalism, or it is an empty phrase.
Economy
The United States is the largest 
economy in the world with a GDP 
at PPP of $ 13 trillion dollars, fol-
lowed by China with $10.1 trillion. 
Russia is 9th with $1.7 trillion, 
about the size of Italy and Brazil.42
Energy is predominant both in 
Russia’s domestic economy and 
foreign trade. Since 2000 there has 
been a close correlation between GDP 
growth and the growth of oil export 
revenues, as the price of Urals oil has 
risen from below $10 to $89.5 a barrel 
today. In 2005, after six years of eco-
nomic growth averaging just under 
7 per cent a year, oil and gas made 
up 20 per cent of GDP, more than 60 
per cent of exports, and 40 per cent 
of budget revenues (some say it is 
60-80 per cent if related industries are 
taken into account).43 The dominance 
of the energy economy is the direct 
result of the failed Soviet industriali-
zation. Soviet-style development was 
dictated not by comparative advan-
tage, but by military imperatives. 
Most Russian products could not 
be sold on world markets. Despite 
high levels of scientific and technical 
manpower, this lack of marketeabil-
ity forced the post-Soviet economy 
back on its natural resource base. 
The Tsarist economy depended on 
grain and timber exports. The present 
equivalent is energy exports. Today 
Russia is more dependent on its natu-
ral resources than in Soviet times, a 
unique type of de-industrialization.
Russia has started to diversify 
its economy. This is only prudent, 
as a large fall in the price of oil can 
wreck the budget, and put economic 
growth into reverse.44 Net capital 
inflows came t $45 billion in 2006, 
and are expected to be $70-$100bn 
in 2007. There is a domestic invest-
ment and boom. Much of this is 
in the extraction industries, but a 
sizeable part now goes to manufac-
turing, real estate, and transport and 
communications. The budget is in 
healthy surplus and the Oil Stabiliza-
tion Fund is well over $100bn, some 
of which is starting to be spent on 
Putin’s ‘National Projects’. However, 
there is an issue about how far diver-
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sification will go, which is bound 
up with the political debate about 
Russia’s future. The westernizers 
(or Europeanists) favour integra-
tion into the European economy as 
a basis for political partnership. The 
Eurasians are attracted by the idea 
of using energy to maintain Russia 
as an independent power centre, 
balancing between Europe and Asia.
The dynamism of China has encour-
aged talk of creating an East Asian 
hydrocarbon market on the basis of 
Russian energy resources. The Eura-
sianists are currently winning the 
argument, because the energy econ-
omy has structural features which 
tends towards its self-perpetuation. 
I mention five of these. The most 
familiar is the so-called ‘Dutch 
disease’, in which cash inflows from 
energy exports weaken the com-
petitiveness of non-energy sectors 
by strengthening the currency. This 
has already started to happen. An 
appreciating ruble has weakened 
exports and boosted imports. The 
tradable sectors of GDP are growing 
below average, so the huge current 
account surplus is contracting. 
Second, natural resources are 
viewed as part of the nation’s inherit-
ance that have to be kept under state 
control. This divides the Russian 
economy into a ‘strategic sector’ 
controlled by the Kremlin, and a pri-
vate enterprise sector outside it. The 
strategic sector (undefined) exhibits 
a neo-patrimonial form of politi-
cal economy in which power and 
wealth are fused together. Far from 
liberalizing its energy markets, the 
Kremlin has consolidated Gazprom’s 
monopoly and has progressively 
brought oil production under state 
control. Its policy of keeping prop-
erty rights fluid in order to allow for 
further consolidation under state 
control deters both domestic and 
foreign investment in the energy 
economy.45 The neo-patrimonial 
economy also creates a huge problem 
for the political succession, since the 
transfer of power always involves 
the redistribution of property. 
Third, natural resource abun-
dance diverts economic energy from 
creating wealth into distributing it. 
Russian economic life is dominated 
by the struggle for rents – at all 
levels of the economy. These rents 
are shared between the govern-
ment (in revenues and bribes), the 
owners of oil and gas companies, 
and the consumers (in the form of 
subsidized prices). The real issue 
at the heart of the Yukos affair was 
the redistribution of Russia’s oil 
assets and windfall profits.46 
Fourth, a natural resource-based 
economy encourages autocracy by 
giving the government a revenue 
base outside the income tax system, 
and thus less need for popular sup-
port for its policies. An independent 
revenue base sustained the autocracy 
throughout Russian history: first 
land, then oil. Today the share of gov-
ernment revenues from energy would 
have reached 100 per cent had not 
the stabilization fund been created. 
Finally, natural resource abun-
dance leads to a struggle for control 
of territory. The uneven distribution 
of resources encourages resource-rich 
regions to break away or encourages 
resource-poor regions to establish 
control over the whole country by 
authoritarian means. Autocracy 
and centralization, the great conti-
nuities in Russia’s political system, 
are thus firmly rooted in Russia’s 
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resource geography.47 They are also 
self-perpetuating. Their geopoliti-
cal implications dominate Russian 
thinking about how to secure its 
‘space’ and conduct its foreign policy.
In principle, there is no reason 
why the energy economy should 
not continue to grow in absolute 
terms, but decline as a proportion of 
Russian GDP. However, concentra-
tion on the political use of energy 
may prevent this benign economic 
development. In the short-run energy 
allows Russia to cut a striking figure 
on the world stage. In the long-run 
it may, by failing to provide enough 
economic activity for its scientists 
and engineers, prevent it from 
realizing its economic potential.
Political System
Russia’s place in the international 
club of great powers depends on its 
ability to develop a more ‘western’ 
political system. Democracy can take 
many forms, but its core principle, 
of accountability of governments 
to voters, is an important source 
of power, at home and abroad. 
Autocracy is weak domestically and 
unattractive externally. At home, it 
alienates the state from the masses, 
restricting its ability to mobilise 
support. Putin’s inability to reform 
the military is a telling index of 
its limitation: personal popularity 
is no substitute for a ‘democratic 
mandate’. Autocracy provides no 
incentive – except possibly in Central 
Asia – for the reintegration of the 
CIS into Chubais’s ‘liberal empire’, 
and it makes Russia a problem-
atic member for the ‘democratic 
clubs’ which it wishes to join. 
The secretiveness of the Russian 
Government makes it very hard 
for anyone to gauge its intentions 
or understand its modus operandi. 
Such opaqueness encourages the 
spread of the most far-fetched con-
spiracy theories, none of which can 
be proved or disproved. Was the 
FSB, as Litvinenko claimed, behind 
the Moscow apartment bombings 
of 1999? The Government refused 
to conduct an independent, pub-
lic inquiry. Nor have there been 
independent, public inquiries into 
the Moscow theatre hostage crisis 
in 2002, the Beslan school hostage 
crisis of 2004, or, indeed, the Kursk 
tragedy. The Russian political sys-
tem remains closed to an extent 
almost unimaginable in the west.
The big question is: do the tenta-
tive steps towards greater openness 
which developed under Gorbachev 
and Yeltsin represent a decisive 
rupture with the tradition of autoc-
racy or are they simply temporary 
deviations from a persisting ten-
dency for autocratic government? 
‘The secretiveness of the 
Russian Government makes it 
very hard for anyone to gauge 
its intentions or understand its 
modus operandi’
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Has Russia’s political ‘genetic code’ 
remained more or less intact?
Richard Pipes is the best known 
exponent of the continuity thesis. 
Russia’s incapacity for freedom is 
rooted in the long history of the 
‘patrimonial state’.48 Recent evi-
dence from opinion polls reveal ‘a 
preference for order over freedom, 
suspicion of democracy and the 
free market, and nostalgia for the 
Soviet Union’.49 Against this it can 
be argued that the current turning 
away from democracy is not the 
consequence of ancient history but 
an understandable response to the 
weakness and corruption of govern-
ment in the post-communist period. 
The restoration of the state and the 
economy, the humbling of the oli-
garchs, the curtailment of corruption 
and gangsterism, were bound to be 
top priorities for any post-Yeltsin 
government.50 Yet the accelerating 
momentum to centralise and control, 
beyond any reasonable require-
ments for a strong state or ‘the war 
on terrorism’, does suggest that a 
historical reflex may be at work.
The continuity theorists can 
point to the absence in the Russian 
political tradition of any doctrine 
of restraint on the ruler’s actions. 
For almost 500 years ‘The Russian 
tsar’s power was unconstrained by 
a constitution, by laws or by rep-
resentative institutions’.51 Lacking 
real feudalism, or a dense network 
of self-governing towns, Russia’s 
political tradition is more akin to 
Oriental despotism. It is indisput-
ably part of Christendom, but since 
Byzantium, Russian Orthodoxy has 
been a form of Caesaropapism, more 
like Islam than Protestantism or even 
Catholicism. As Berdyaev put it, ‘In 
Russia God’s things are rendered 
to Caesar’. A corollary is political 
messianism – all are equal before 
the God/Tsar – which is the specifi-
cally Russian root of communism. 
There is no internal escape, there-
fore, from the tradition of absolute 
monarchy. Whether, as Martin Malia 
believes, the fragile Russian liberal-
ism of the silver age would have 
broken the hold of despotism but 
for the First World War remains 
the great unanswered question. 
Instead Lenin’s Bolshevik state was 
built on the foundations of Tsar-
ist autocracy. With the exception of 
Catherine, the great Russian rulers 
have been the most terrible ones: 
Ivan IV, Peter the Great, Stalin.
Autocracy is also connected with 
empire. Pipes writes: ‘Russia has 
had to administer too vast a territory 
with too limited resources to indulge 
in democracy.’52 In Putin’s Russia 
this logic is illustrated by Chechnya. 
Chechnya undoubtedly strengthened 
the Russian security state. Putin 
claims the war has been won: there 
have been no suicide bombings in 
Moscow since 2004 - although the 
derailment of the Moscow-St Peters-
burg express train in August 2007 
should cast doubt on such a claim 
- and the the level of local violence 
has sharply de-escalated, though at 
the cost of handing power in Grozny 
to a colourful and brutal gangster, 
Ramzan Kadyrov. According to the 
historian Geoffrey Hosking, the 
Russian empire (‘Rossia’) has always 
prevented the political development 
of the Russian nation (‘Rus). Rus-
sia had to become a nation before 
it could become a democracy.53 It 
seemed that this was about to hap-
pen when Russia pulled out of the 
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USSR. It has now become clearer, as I 
have pointed out, that the end of the 
Soviet empire did not automatically 
spell the end of the imperial state.
A third explanation for the re-
emergence of autocracy pays less 
attention to ancient history, and 
more to the dynamics of revolu-
tion. According to Vladimir Mau, 
the collapse of the old regime (in 
this case communism) weakens the 
state and fragments society to such 
an extent that support grows for the 
reimposition of order by force. Thus, 
the ‘regime of personal dictatorship’ 
arises from the ashes of revolution, 
whether it be that of Cromwell, 
Napoleon, or Stalin.54 Whether the 
present Putin phase will be followed 
by a consolidation of the dictator-
ship or the growth of a competitive 
democracy depends on the choice 
between nation-state and empire.55
Conclusion
My interest has been in what happens 
when the pull of a country’s history 
comes up against the constraints of its 
international position. Will the coun-
try try to weaken the constraints? Or 
will it adjust to them? The first may 
involve international conflict, the 
second domestic conflict. My own 
tentative conclusions are as follows:
The attempt to impose ‘liberal 
empire’ or ‘sovereign democracy’ on 
the seceded parts of the old Soviet 
Union will fail. Russia is bound to 
exercise a large influence on the 
former Soviet territories, but it will 
have to share that influence with 
others. Russian has too little to offer 
for exclusive dominance. The EU, the 
United States, and China offer the 
former Soviet republics opportuni-
ties for ‘balancing’ against Russia. 
Russia will not transform its 
economic system into an Anglo-
American type of economy. 
We may see some compromise 
between a European (Nicolas 
Sarkozy-style) system and authori-
tarian state capitalism.
The territorial and economic 
imperatives of empire will continue to 
make it difficult for Russia to evolve 
a political system which conforms to 
western norms. The middle class will 
expand, but there is no assurance it 
will become ‘liberal’ in the western 
sense. So the Russian political system 
will probably remain autocratic for 
the foreseeable future, with a facade 
of democracy. This is disappointing, 
but is nevertheless an improvement 
on anything it has experienced, except 
in the briefest moments, in the past.
It is hard to see Russia offering 
the world a new type of universal-
ism, as it once did with communism. 
The Russian strain of political mes-
sianism is pretty much exhausted. 
Nevertheless, Russia may be able 
to develop, out of its own spiritual 
and cultural resources, an attractive 
alternative to both the American 
and European models, provided it 
achieves long run economic success.
If the attempt to make Russia into 
an independent centre of power to 
rival the United States (and eventu-
ally China) fails, what role will it 
then play? A suggestive analogy 
may be with France during the long 
period of Anglo-American hegemony. 
Broadly speaking, France has acted 
the role of ‘awkward partner’ in the 
Anglo-American club – something 
which has continued right up to its 
orchestration of opposition to the Iraq 
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war in 2003. On two occasions in the 
20th century France helped to bring 
down the world monetary system 
– in 1931 and again in 1969-70. De 
Gaulle took France out of the NATO 
military alliance in 1966. France, 
uniquely in western Europe, built its 
own independent nuclear deterrent, 
and has been a champion of creating 
a European military capacity outside 
NATO. Without explicitly challeng-
ing US leadership, France tried to 
build its own ‘ostpolitik’ with Russia; 
and to use its axis with Germany to 
create a European position on foreign 
policy. The French have been the 
most insistent that Europe has inter-
ests which are not identical to those 
of the United States – particularly 
in the Middle East, where France 
has been pro-Arab. There is a paral-
lel between Putin and Charles de 
Gaulle – both leaders trying to rescue 
their countries from humilitation and 
defeat and carve out a role consonant 
with national feelings of mission 
and pride. Both leaders interpreted 
national interest as ‘sovereignty’.
France’s dream of creating an 
independent centre has never suc-
ceeded, but the role of ‘awkward 
partner’ has given a distinctive 
flavour to French diplomacy. The 
analogy is not exact, since shared 
interests and values put a limit on 
France’s truculence which may be 
lacking in Russia’s case. However, 
there may be just enough shared 
interests and values to make Rus-
sia an ‘awkward partner’ rather 
than a ‘spoiler’. ‘Awkward part-
nership’ may offer Russia its best 
hope of reconciling its yearning 
for independence with the realities 
of the modern world. It is prob-
ably the best the West can expect.
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